I once heard a story about a museum that claimed to have the skull of Christopher Columbus. In fact, they claimed to have two such skulls, one of Columbus when he was a small boy and one when he was a grown man.
second-order induction principle: VP((P0 & Vx(Px -Pax)) -VxPx).
The sentence AR is categorical in the sense that all models of AR are isomorphic to the natural numbers, and thus to each other. Similarly, let AN be the conjunction of the axioms of a real closed field, including the second-order completeness principle that every bounded non-empty set has a least upper bound:
VP((3yPy & 3xVy(Py -» y < x)) -» 3z(Vi/(Py -» y < z) & Vx(Vy(Py ^y<x)-+z< x))).
The sentence AN is a categorical characterization of the real numbers. It follows from these categoricity results that second-order logic is not compact, and neither the downward nor the upward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem holds for it. Moreover, second-order logic is inherently incomplete in the sense that the set of logical truths is not definable in arithmetic. A fortiori, there is no effective deductive system that is both sound and complete for second-order languages. To see this, let $ be a (first-order) sentence in the language of arithmetic. Then # is true (in the natural numbers) if and only if AR -+ $ is a logical truth. So if the set of second-order logical truths were arithmetic then so would the set of truths of arithmetic, contradicting Tarski's theorem on the indefinability of truth. (See Shapiro [1991] , Chapters 3-4 for details.) In some minds, these features disqualify second-order logic as logic The idea is that to qualify as logic, a consequence relation must have an effective, complete deductive system. Quine [1986] argues that once we introduce variables ranging over functions or sets, we have crossed the border out of logic and into mathematics. Second-order logic, he says, is set theory in disguise.
The weight of these considerations depends on what a logical theory is supposed to accomplish. Burgess is correct that 'it is meaningless to speak of a "preference for first-order logic" without specifying for what application'. On the first page of the preface to [1991] , I say that one contention of the book is that 'higher-order logic has an important role to play in foundational studies' and that second-order logic 'provides better models of important aspects of mathematics... than first-order logic does' (p. v). I did not mean to say that the second-order consequence relation can play every role in foundational studies, nor did I say that secondorder logic provides better models of every aspect of mathematics. In a brief review, Michael Resnik [1993] noted my eclectic approach: ' [Shapiro] hypothesize^] that ... there is no single true or even best formal model of an informal practice, but rather several non-equivalent ones that exemplify several desiderata in varying degrees'.
Resnik remarked that one of my fundamental theses is that restricting 'oneself to first-order languages poorly trades expressive power for supposed ontic and epistemic gains'. The sacrificed 'epistemic gains' concern the existence of a complete deductive system for the first-order consequence relation. Truth be told, I have little to say about deduction, or modeling deduction, in the book. Although I do present a few deductive systems for second-order languages, and prove some theorems in them and some metatheorems about them, the main focus of the book is on model-theoretic semantics.
The underlying issue, then, concerns the role of model-theoretic semantics. What, if anything, is model theory a model of? If one takes logic to be only the study of deduction, then the central component of a logical study would be a deductive system. On this orientation, model theory is only a tool to help the logician study the deductive system-to learn what can and cannot be deduced therein. Thus, model theory itself plays no role in modeling mathematical practice. From this perspective, a logician would want, and perhaps insist on, an exact match between the model-theoretic consequence relation and the deductive consequence relation. Completeness would thus be at least a strong desideratum in logic.
This orientation does not mesh well with at least some informal attitudes of logicians. They often speak of a deductive system as sound or complete for the semantics, not the other way around. Throughout the book, and especially in Chapters 2 and 5, I tried to articulate an approach in which model-theoretic semantics captures something about the semantics of ordinary mathematical discourse. The relationship between a formal language and a model-theoretic interpretation represents the relationship between language and the world. Satisfaction represents truth conditions and model-theoretic consequence captures the notion of truth-preservation. Harold Hodes [1984] put it elegantly: truth in a model is a model of truth.
Burgess wrote:
Considering... applications to the idealized description of mathematical practice, the preference for syntactic, proof-theoretic logics such as first-order over semantic, model-theoretic second-order logic... surely results from its being mathematical practice not to accept results without proof.
Of course, I agree that it is mathematical practice not to accept results without proof and, again, a model-theoretic consequence relation is not meant to capture the notion of 'proof or even 'provable'. It does not follow, however, that model theory is irrelevant to the study of correct proof. Burgess added, parenthetically, that in refusing to accept results without proof, mathematicians are ... achieving agreement... about which results are acceptable. Disagreements would surely become very common if they began accepting conjectures on the strength of 'intuitions' to the effect that a proposition is a syntactically undeducible-semantic consequence of already accepted results.
Near the end of the review, Burgess added that none of the mathematician's work 'consists of "intuiting" undecidable consequences' from premises. I presume that Burgess did not mean to suggest that my view is that mathematicians should start relying on unestablished intuitions instead of proof. However, the dichotomy between falling back on first-order logic and relying on unestablished intuitions is a false one, and so is the suggestion that we must choose between proof theory and model theory.
Let X be a branch of mathematical study, such as arithmetic, analysis, set theory, or field theory. At some point, the mathematician describessomehow-what the theory is about. For example, he may characterize the real numbers or the structure of all fields. One thesis of Shapiro [1991] is that modeling this description as an axiomatization is useful and perspicuous. Call this the axiomatic approach to description. The axiomatization succeeds in the purpose of description if the intended subject matter of X-theory coincides with the models of the axiomatization (up to isomorphism). If the intended subject matter is the class of fields, then every model of the axioms should be a field and every field should be a model of the axioms. If the intended subject matter is the real numbers, then the real numbers should be a model of the axioms and all models should be isomorphic to the reals.
An alternative to the axiomatic approach is to characterize the intended structure(s) in set theory (or another background such as category theory). On this set-theoretic approach, the requirement is that the characterization should hold of all and only the intended interpretations of X-theory (again, up to isomorphism). The description can be in a first-order language. Notice, however, that the set-theoretic approach presupposes that the background set theory is already understood. The intended interpretation (s) of this background theory could be described in the same or another background, but this regress must stop somewhere.
I argue in the book (Chapter 9, Section 9.3) that there is an important presupposition to both the axiomatic approach in a second-order language and the set-theoretic approach (no matter what the underlying logic of the latter). Each assumes that for any fixed domain d, a quantifier ranging over the subsets of d (or the properties on d) is serviceably clear and unambiguous. On both approaches, such a quantifier appears in the descriptions of such structures as the natural numbers, the real numbers, and the Euclidean plane. On the axiomatic approach the presupposition is registered in the second-order quantifiers, as interpreted via standard semantics. On the set-theoretic approach, the presupposition is registered with the power-set axiom, stating that every set has a (unique) powerset. Thus, the move to set theory does not lessen the presupposition, even if the set theory is first-order.
Of course, there is more to mathematics than the mere description of structures. In the pursuit of X-theory, the mathematician proves theorems about these structures. How do we model this activity? If the logic were complete, it might be natural to assume that the mathematician proceeds, or could proceed (or should proceed), by deducing consequences of the axiomatization. This would weigh in favor of first-order logic, since it is complete. However, this natural thought is problematic. Boolos [1987] gives an example of a valid argument / in a first-order language and sketches a short derivation of the conclusion of I from its premises in a second-order deductive system. A slight variation on the argument would yield a modeltheoretic proof that / is valid in the model-theoretic semantics. Since / is first-order, and first-order logic is complete, there is a derivation of the conclusion of / from its premises in a standard first-order deductive system. Boolos shows, however, that the shortest first-order derivation of / has more lines than there are particles in the known universe. 1 We cannot know that / is valid via a derivation of it in a first-order deductive system. Boolos concludes that ... the fact that we so readily recognize the validity of / would seem to provide as strong a proof as could be reasonably be asked for that no standard first-order logical system can be* taken to be a satisfactory idealization of the... processes... whereby we recognize (first-order!) logical consequences. Clearly, if a first-order argument is valid then in principle an epistemic agent can learn this via a derivation in a standard, first-order deductive system. However, examples like these should make one wary of the epistemic significance of these 'in principle' declarations.
Burgess agrees that 'little of the work in X-theory consists of deducing theorems from the X-axioms... Results are proved about X-structures "from the outside", ...'. That is, mathematicians typically do not proceed by making deductions within X-theory. They often invoke other resources. This dovetails with some of my points, but Burgess added that the theorem-proving activity is 'perhaps well represented as making deductions from first-order set theory'. This suggests a preference for the set-theoretic approach to description, insisting that logic of the underlying set theory is first-order. The idea is that first-order set theory provides a uniform foundation for mathematics, useful for many purposes. I give details for this approach in Section 9.3 of the ill-named 'competition' Chapter 9. This uniformity has a cost, however. The background set theory has a staggering ontology. Burgess conceded that 'logicians are well aware that the full See my Chapter 5, Section 5.3.4 for this and other cases of 'speed-up'. strength of the usual systems of set theory is not really needed'.
In these terms, a proposal of Shapiro [1991] is that we understand the activity of the X-theorist as the discovery of logical consequences of the (second-order) axiomatization. Since, as noted above, the book does not have much to say about how best to model the process of learning the logical consequences of axioms, some readers may take my view to be that the pursuit of X-theory consists of deductions from the axioms of X-theory in one of the deductive systems for second-order logic. However, this is not my view. Burgess is correct that little of the work in X-theory consists of deduction from the X-axioms, whether the latter are first-order or higherorder. Moreover, for the central cases, many of the theorems of X-theory are not logical consequences of the first-order axioms of X-theory. Thus, on the present plan, we should not regard the axiomatization as first-order. As Burgess notes, most of the theorems of X-theory can be rendered as logical consequences of the set-theoretic description of X-theory. However, if a second-order axiomatization of X-theory is categorical, then every truth of X-theory is a consequence of it. Of course, the X-theorist does not simply intuit the consequences of the second-order axiomatization, she must prove that her theorems are logical consequences of the axioms. Otherwise, she is not doing mathematics. Sometimes the proof is accomplished via (what may be modeled as) a deduction of the conclusion from the axioms in a second-order deductive system. More often, however, the proof is done 'from the outside'. Typically, the X-theorist embeds the structure of X in a richer one and uses the more powerful theory to shed light on X. The more powerful theory may be analysis, complex analysis, geometry, or even set theory. See Chapter 5 for a number of examples.
A critic might retort along the following lines: 2 I seem to say that the norm-the telos-of X-theory is (or can be modeled as) the production of logical consequences of the second-order axiomatization of X. But I just admitted that the mathematician must not only produce these consequences, she must also prove that they are consequences. If something is supposed to constitute the norm behind a practice, then it should not be necessary to show that one has met the norm. That would start a regress. How does one show that one has met a norm? What is the norm for that?
The rejoinder to this consideration goes to the heart of the matter. I do not claim that the second-order consequence relation constitutes the norm of X-theory-in that sense of 'norm'. It is not enough for the produced results just to be second-order consequences. The second-order consequence relation represents what may be called the standard for X-theory. There is surely no regress in demanding that the practicing X-theorist prove that her results meet the standard. By way of analogy, the standard of ordinary discourse includes telling the truth, and at least sometimes a speaker must show that he has told the truth. There is, of course, a potential for a regress here, but in practice it stops. In these terms, the norm of X-theory is to show that one has met the standard of producing logical consequences of the second-order axiomatization of X-theory.
It is worthwhile to emphasize the difference between two notions of logical consequence and, thus, the difference between two purposes of logical study (see, for example, Corcoran [1972] , [1973] ). One notion of logical consequence, usually introduced informally at the start of elementary logic courses, has a modal or semantic component. One says that a sentence (or proposition) $ is a consequence of a set F of sentences (or propositions) if it is not possible for every member of F to be true and yet $ false, or that $ is true under every interpretation in which every member of F is true. Call this the modal/semantic notion of consequence (assuming for the sake of this discussion that there is only one such). A second notion (or group of notions) of consequence centers around deduction or justification. In this sense, $ is a consequence of F if it possible to (fully) justify <£ on the basis of the members of F, or if there is a deduction of $ ah 1 of whose premises are in F. Call this the deductive notion of consequence.
Model theory explicates the modal/semantic notion of consequence, and proof theory explicates the deductive one. The completeness theorem is that a first-order sentence $ is a proof-theoretic consequence of a set F of first-order sentences if and only if * is a model-theoretic consequence of F. Thus, for first-order languages, the modal/semantic notion of consequence arguably coincides in extension with the proof-theoretic notion of consequence. This pleasant harmony might lead one to forget that the two notions answer to different goals of logical theory. The modal/semantic notion sheds light on the semantics of mathematical discourse, to help capture the sense in which theorems of, say, arithmetic, real analysis, or our generic X-theory, are about the natural numbers, the real numbers, and X, respectively. The goal of this aspect of logical theory is to provide axiomatizations that characterize the intended structures of the theory, up to isomorphism, in order to codify the notion of truth-preservation.
In contrast, the deductive notion of consequence sheds light on the mathematical practice of justifying one's conclusions and the desire to keep track of what is presupposed or involved in a justification. In a formal deduction, all premises must be made explicit, so that the reader can read off exactly what is presupposed in the justification of the conclusion (assuming the deduction is correct, of course). The reader of a proof should be able to determine what we may call the epistemic pedigree of the conclusion.
Corcoran [1973] writes that if $ is a consequence of F in the modal/se-mantic sense, then the conclusion $ is 'already logically implicit in' the premises and that one would be redundant if she were to assert the premises and then also assert the conclusion, because asserting the conclusion 'would be making another statement without adding any new information' not already conveyed by the premises. Corcoran does not intend 'logically implicit in' to entail something like 'can be justified solely on the basis of, since he explicitly contrasts this notion with the deductive one. He envisions the possibility that $ may be 'already implicit in' F, in the above sense, even if deducing $ from F is not possible-even if it is not possible to justify $ on the basis of F alone. Suppose that a theorist has conclusively proved that $ is a modal/semantic consequence of F, but the proof involves some sort of embedding of the structures that F characterizes into a richer structure. As noted above, this is quite common in mathematics. In such cases, the mathematician has shown that the theorem is a modal/semantic consequence of the second-order A"-axioms, but not that it is a deductive consequence of them. Typically, the theorem is a deductive consequence of these axioms together with some facts about the background, or embedding, theory. Let E be the principles of the background theory used to establish $. Then, in symbols (and roughly), the mathematician established (F + £) h $, and this shows that F \= $. However, it does not show that Fh$ and perhaps <£ is not justifiable on the basis of F alone. 3 Perhaps F 1/ <£.
Veblen [1904] was aware of the fact that different goals suggest different types of logical consequence. The purpose of his axiomatization of geometry was to describe Euclidean space. An explicit aim was 'to show that there is essentially only one class of which... the axioms are valid...' Veblen noted that once a 'categorical' characterization is given, 'any further axiom would have to be considered redundant', to which he added a footnote '... even were it not deducible from the [other] axioms by a finite number of syllogisms'. Notice that such a 'further axiom' is redundant only to the description of the structure, not to the codification of what can be deduced about it, nor of what is known about it. Moreover, Veblen did not codify the epistemic pedigree of the truths about the characterized structure. We may need 'further axioms' to justify some modal/semantic consequences of the axioms. Compare Veblen's orientation with that given in Hilbert's famous 'Mathematical Problems' lecture [1900, problem 2]:
When we are investigating the foundations of a science, we must set up a system of axioms which contains an exact and complete description of the... ideas of that science... [N] o statement within the realm of the science... is held to be true unless it can be deduced from the axioms by means of a finite number of logical steps.
The first sentence of this passage gives the stated goal of Veblen [1904] . The second sentence, however, contradicts Veblen's claim about redundancy. However, these two great postulate theorists were not at odds with one another. Veblen's purposes are served by the modal/semantic notion of consequence while Hilbert invokes the deductive notion. Along similar lines, Church ([1956] , p. 323) presents two different orientations to logical systems. In one of them, the logician adds 'postulates' to a logistic system, in order to model the process of deducing consequences from them. This orientation concerns the determination of epistemic pedigree. Church's second approach is to think of axioms as 'propositional functions'. Accordingly, the axioms constitute an implicit definition of a type of structure. In current philosophical jargon, an axiomatization is a functional definition. This is the descriptive goal, and Church argues that the second-order consequence relation is appropriate for this goal. 4 In a favorable review of my book, Michael Potter [1994] wrote that the choice between first-order logic and second-order logic 'must rest on their power to give an illuminating account of what it is that mathematicians do'. Mathematicians do many things, and it may be that no single system captures everything they do. To the extent that the logician studies the practice of describing structures, second-order logic-with standard semantics-does well. To the extent that she provides a tool to study deduction, then second-order logic-with standard semantics-does not do as well. This is a burden of incompleteness.
Mea culpa: In the book, Chapter 2 is the main place where completeness is treated in philosophical terms. That discussion is in the framework of foundationalism-the desire for absolute certainty. My main philosophical agenda was to reject foundationalism. Thus, I may have given the impression that all motivations for completeness are holdovers from foundationalism. I did write that a preference for first-order logic is a tendency spawned by foundationalist programs (p. 25), but I also called first-order logic a natural kind of sorts (p. 161). There is no point in trying to decide whether my view then was that foundationalism provides the only motivation for a first-order logic, but it is not my view now (see note 5 below). In rejecting foundationalism, we do not give up all reasons to regard completeness as a desideratum.
In Chapter 2, Section 2.5.3,1 briefly discuss the role of deductive systems * Church added that since many branches of mathematics can be treated in this descriptive way, via a higher-order axiomatization, '... logic and mathematics should be characterized, not as different subjects, but as elementary and advanced parts of the same subject ' (p. 332) . This is a logicism of sorts, but Church's orientation does not aim for the supposed epistemic goals of logicism. Instead of cutting mathematics down to logic-to extend the epistemic transparency of logic up to mathematics-Church extends logic to include mathematics. If anything, this undermines the alleged transparency of logic.
in the context of an incomplete logic. How should justification, or relative justification, be codified in the anti-foundationalist spirit? I briefly consider a proposal that we regard a proposition * to be completely justified on the basis of a set F of propositions if (we know that) $ is a modal/semantic consequence of F. This would make justification completely subordinate to modal/semantic validity. I quickly dismiss the proposal as unhelpful and counter-intuitive. Instead, I propose that we keep a loosely independent notion of justification and demand that the deductive system meet it. Soundness is crucial; completeness is not.
The desire to codify justification or epistemic pedigree need not be a point of contention between advocates and opponents of second-order logic. There are, after all, good deductive systems for second-order languages. The standard semantics will not be a perfect tool for studying the deductive consequence relation(s), due to the incompleteness. However, standard semantics is not aimed at the study of deduction. It is aimed at semantics. For studying the deductive consequence relation of a second-order language, the non-standard Henkin semantics is complete, and will do fine (see my Chapter 3, Section 3.3, and Chapter 4, Section 4.3).
Ignacio Jan6 [1993] wrote an extensive critical study of second-order logic.
5 The present distinctions allow us to put some of his insights in their proper context. One theme of my book is to articulate the thesis that there is no sharp distinction between logic and mathematics (see note 4 above). The study of logic, especially the logic of mathematics, involves some substantial mathematical assumptions. Jan6 concedes that there is a sense of 'logic' in which this is true:
... every language has its logic, determined by its consequence relation, regardless of how much content is carried by it. In this sense, second-order logic is certainly logic (being the logic of second-order languages); but then so are appropriate reformulations of... set theory and real analysis. Indeed, any mathematical theory can be embedded in the logic of some language just by treating the terms peculiar to that language as logical particles of the language... (p. 67) Jan6 suggests, however, that there is also a 'narrower' or 'strict' conception of logic, which we must distinguish from mathematics proper. For this, the logician focuses on languages whose logic ... holds no substantial content. Logic, in the strict sense, is contentless. The main attraction... in a conception of logic along these lines is that, when deal-Ing with an axiomatized theory, logic does not add any mathematical presuppositions through the back door, forcing us to be totally explicit about what we accept regarding the objects of the theory. The point is not that these presuppositions may be false, but that they are substantial. (Should we need them, we could postulate them beside the proper axioms of the theory.) (p. 67) Jane" argues for the usefulness of his 'strict' notion of logic in terms of rigorous axiomatization and, in particular, rigorous deduction. We choose axioms because 'their constants mean what they do', but in the pursuit of the theory-in deducing consequences-the mathematician should appeal only to what is explicitly stated in the axioms. This is 'good policy' since it 'restricts the appeal to intuition to the finding of the axioms'. If the logic is not sufficiently 'strict', there is a danger that some substantial facts concerning the structure may be implicitly coded into the logic.
The historical roots for this desideratum run deep, and they are sound. The drive for rigor throughout the nineteenth century resulted in just this 'policy'. We see it expressed in the quote from Hilbert [1900] above, and it is an explicit and crucial plank of Frege's logicism. The purpose of Frege [1884] was to show that arithmetic is analytic and, thus, that it can be developed without appeal to spatial or temporal intuition. We cannot see whether intuition is essential for a mathematical theory until we develop the field fully, with all assumptions made explicit.
Some readers may thus take Janets narrow or strict conception of logic to be of-a-piece with the analytic/synthetic distinction and the concomitant form/content distinction, a dogma of empiricism. Consider, for example, Jane's remark (p. 72) that in an axiomatic theory 'we do not want [the] meaning [of the non-logical terminology] to play any part in the further development of the theory'. If this were the crux of the matter, then one line of response would be to wax Quinean and complain that there is no significant distinction between what has 'substantial' content and what does not. In some minds, the distinctions invoked here are destined for the philosophical graveyard. Of course, this is still controversial, and the analytic/synthetic distinction has not yet gone the route of phlogiston and caloric. Perhaps a dispute over second-order logic can be framed in these global terms. However, the battle lines are all too familiar, and I suspect that second-order logic is not an interesting case in this context.
For present purposes, the sweeping issue of analyticity can be set aside. The bulk of Jane's use of terms like 'substantial', 'content', 'meaning', and 'intuition' occur in his introductory pages and the notions do not play a major role in the paper. 6 More importantly, even if there is no sharp border between what has substantial content and what is contentless, a fuzzy border is still a border. Once again, there is a point to developing a logic whose consequence relation helps track presuppositions, or epistemic pedigree. Jan6's strict sense of logic is quite relevant for this. The epistemically tractable notion is none other than the deductive consequence relation outlined above. In characterizing it, the logician should use as few mathematical presuppositions as possible.
Notice the contrast between Jane's remark that if we need any further principles, we can 'postulate them beside the proper axioms of the theory' and Veblen's statement that once one has a categorical axiomatization, any further axiom would be 'redundant', even if it is not deducible from the others. Although Veblen's remark is in a footnote, and Jane's remark is introductory and parenthetical, the issue is crucial. Like Hilbert, Jan6 is concerned with justification and epistemic pedigree, while Veblen is concerned with description.
Arguably, the set of strict consequences of a recursive set of sentences should be recursively enumerable. That is, completeness is necessary for strictness in Jane's sense. Suppose that 3> follows from F in the strict sense. Then there should be a derivation of <£ from F in which every line can be recognized to follow from previous hues. Completeness follows if we add standard assumptions about the syntax of formal languages and the assumption that the extension of any rule that humans can effectively recognize is recursive. Clearly, however, effectiveness is not sufficient to guarantee strictness. Suppose, for example, that we think of first-order ZFC as the underlying logic for every field of mathematics, with the membership symbol as a 'logical constant'. We add effective rules expressing set-theoretic principles to first-order logic. As noted above, Burgess suggested something along these lines. In the imagined scenario, to reason from premises to conclusion in some domain with this 'logic', it suffices to follow well understood rules concerning the use of the 'logical constants' (including the membership symbol). Surely this system does not capture the desire for epistemic pedigree. To quote Jan£, 'if the underlying logic involves set-theoretic notions, then the set-theoretic content they carry will be diffused through the theory without being articulated in the axioms' of the theory (p. 75). Substantial mathematical theorems will turn out to be 'logically true'. Thus effectiveness does not ensure strictness.
Jand says that first-order logic is logic in the 'strict sense'. Let us see why:
That no substantial content is coded in [first-order logic] is made clear by noticing that to reason from its premises to its conclusion within its limits it suffices to follow well-understood rules concerning the use of the logical constants, (p. 67) Janets point is that the axioms and rules for first-order logic can be justified by appeal to general features about the meaning of the usual logical constants. We just check each axiom and rule to make sure that it carries no specific mathematical (or metaphysical) information. Jan6 illustrates this procedure with a footnote (p. 67) concerning the universal quantifier. 8 Notice, however, that such an analysis may not be sufficient to remove unwanted content. In quasi-Quinean terms, some substantial content may be carried in the so-called 'meaning-determined' rules. Our 'logical intuitions' may be theory-laden. For example, recall that a significant school of mathematicians and logicians held that excluded middle is itself a 'substantial' principle, and some still do. Contemporary mathematicians may not harbor doubts about the acceptability of excluded middle, but some may have enough residual constructivist inclinations to warrant the inclusion of the principle of excluded middle in the epistemic pedigree of any theorems proved with it. Given the history, it is surely coherent for a mathematician to insist that excluded middle should not be included as a logical principle in the 'strict sense'. For someone who holds this, the uses of excluded middle should be listed and not simply 'diffused throughout the logic'. For an intuitionist, or someone neutral on the issue, classical first-order logic may be too strong to serve Jane's strict sense.
Of course, most mathematicians and philosophers today refuse to balk at excluded middle, even momentarily-and I am among them. We can agree that first-order logic has the requisite strictness, with Jan6, perhaps conceding that our logical intuitions are vague. If there is no sharp, absolute border, then perhaps what counts as strict, or what counts as epistemic pedigree, is a relative affair, depending on what one's interests and background beliefs are.
Notice that there is nothing to prevent anyone from doing logic in Jan6's strict sense with a second-order language. To track epistemic pedigree, the logician should pick axioms and rules that carry no unwanted mathematical (or set-theoretic) information. With this in mind, let us consider the standard deductive system for second-order logic, the system I call D2 in the 8 Jan6 emphasized this in correspondence. The implicit argument is similar to one in Hellman [1986|. 0 See Tennant |1997|. I do not claim that this represents the only, or even the best, understanding of the intuitionistic dialectic. Instead, one might argue that intuitionistic connectives/quantifiers have different 'meaning-determined' rules than their classical counterparts. Accordingly, the law of excluded middle is in line with the meaning of classical disjunction and negation, but not in line with intuitionistic disjuction and negation. Thus, no 'content' has been smuggled into the classical law. The 'content' lies in the extra-logical claim that classical connectives and quantifiers accurately represent their informal counterparts in ordinary mathematical discourse. I am indebted to Geoffrey Hellman here. See also Hellman [1986) .
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book. The axioms and rules for the second-order quantifiers have exactly the same form as the corresponding axioms and rules for the first-order quantifiers. So I presume that those are strict, meaning-determined, etc. There are two other items. One is the comprehension scheme,
one instance for each formula <£ not containing P free. I submit that this scheme just captures the meaning of the predicate variables and so it expresses no specific mathematical information. However, if a reader demurs from the (strictness of) the comprehension scheme, she is free to drop it (following a suggestion in my book). Very little is lost. Whenever this reader wants to use an instance of the comprehension scheme, she can list it as a premise-in the relevant epistemic pedigree-among the non-logical axioms. The other item in D2 is a version of the axiom of choice, Some writers, like Hilbert and Zermelo, argued that this is a principle of logic as well, given how readily it is applied throughout mathematics (see Miraglia [1996] , Chapter 5). But it too can be dropped if the reader finds it substantial. 10 In my book, D2* is the deductive system obtained from D2 by dropping this version of choice (but maintaining the comprehension scheme). I use D2* to study the relative strength (or the epistemic pedigree) of different choice principles. Cocchiarella [1993] calls D2* 'the standard impredicative second-order logic in the syntactical sense 1 , and argues that it is essentially the system that FYege used.
Jan6 gave us an important reminder:
We must not forget that we are concerned about axiomatizing a theory-not just fixing the reference of its terms. ... we do not axiomatize set theory with a view to characterize the (uncharacterizable) universe of sets, but to investigate it and know it better, (p. 85) 10 Whether one should drop the axiom of choice from the logical axioms depends on whether it is important to note every use of choice explicitly. Should the axiom of choice be listed among the epistemic pedigree of theorems that require it? My impression is that choice is so prevalent that mathematicians (and mathematical logicians) have little desire to note its use. Zermelo and Hilbert have been vindicated. Incidentally, Jan6 points out that the proof that second-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory is 'quasi-categorical' does not use the axiom of choice (in either the object language or the meta-theory). Jan6 concludes that the axiom of choice is 'superfluous' in second-order set theory (p. 83). Superfluous for what? It is superfluous for the purpose of characterizing the intended structures (the inaccessible ranks), but not for studying them. See note 3 above.
If 'axiomatizing' here means something like codifying the theorems of a theory, noting the epistemic pedigree of each, then Jane is correct. However, I might reverse the admonition and propose that we are concerned to fix the reference of the terms of our theory (up to isomorphism)-not just to axiomatize in Jane's sense. For the semantic task of reference-fixing, both first-order languages and second-order languages with Henkin semantics fall short.
Jane argued that the expressive resources of second-order languageswitnessed by the categoricity results-confer excessive strength on the logic of second-order languages: '... among the logical consequences of [the second-order Peano axioms] there must be the solutions to all open problems of elementary number theory' (p. 71). Concerning set theory, 'in a certain, perhaps metaphorical sense [the second-order theory] has all solutions to the problems of ordinary mathematics, but it keeps them to itself (p. 80). I submit that for the purpose of describing the subject matter of our theories, this is what we should want. If we have an accurate description of the intended structures of our X-theory, then the solutions to all the open problems about X are and should be modal/semantic consequences of the description. An axiomatization A of, say, arithmetic, is successful for the modal/semantic purpose if the natural numbers are a model of A and if every model of -A is isomorphic to the natural numbers. Now, a sentence $ is a consequence of A if and only if $ holds in all models of A. It follows that if A is successful for the modal/semantic purpose then «£ is a consequence of A if and only if * is true of the natural numbers.
11 In light of Godel's incompleteness theorem, then, completeness is most emphatically not desired for the modal/semantic consequence relation. Of course, how we 'extract' the modal/semantic consequences of A, and what resources we employ in the process, is another matter.
Jane said that by opting for second-order set theory, we 'close the door to a thorough study of the powerset of infinite sets'. This is mistaken. For studying deduction, the theorist adds principles as needed, invoking a deductive notion of consequence. The semantic, model-theoretic notions are relevant to this deductive study, but their role is indirect. Recall that very little of the work in X-theory consists of deducing consequences from the axioms of X (no matter whether the axioms are first-order or higherorder). Most proofs are done 'from the outside'. The semantic goal of description-and the concomitant desideratum of categoricity-is important for codifying the sense in which the mathematician 'goes on as before' when she establishes a theorem about X 'from the outside'. Suppose, for example, that a mathematician proves a theorem $ by embedding the intended structure of X into a richer theory Y. To be sure, the epistemic pedigree for $ should mention the principles of V-theory that were used in the proof (pending the discovery of a better proof). But there is still a clear sense in which the theorem $ is a truth about X. How are we to understand this? From the perspective of the first-order languages, how does the theorem relate to X-theory? For all we know (so far), the theorem $ may not be a logical consequence of the first-order axiomatization of X-theorythere may be models of the first-order axiomatization in which $ is false. On the other hand, if the second-order axiomatization is categorical, then the mathematician has shown that $ is a (modal/semantic) consequence of the axiomatization and, thus that $ is about X. The mathematician has decidedly not gone on as before concerning epistemic pedigree, but she has gone on as before concerning subject matter (see Shapiro [1990] and Shapiro [1991] , Chapter 8).
A typical case is where the mathematician embeds the natural numbers in a richer theory, say set theory. He then defines a property (or set) of natural numbers in the expanded language/theory and applies induction to the new property. The induction principle is applicable simply because the set in question is a set of natural numbers. It would be a mistake to refuse to apply induction, simply because he has not defined the property in the first-order language alone. As Shaughan Lavine ([1994] , p. 231 n. 24) put it:
Part of what it is to define a property of natural numbers is to be willing to extend mathematical induction to it. To fail to do so is to violate our rules for extending and further specifying our arithmetical usage. Dummett ([1994] , p. 337) echoes the same idea (in developing the idea that arithmetic truth is indefinitely extensible):
It is part of the concept of natural number, as we now understand it, that induction with respect to any well-defined property is a ground for asserting all natural numbers to have that property, (my emphasis)
The second-order induction axiom-and not the first-order induction scheme-captures this feature of arithmetic truth. The same goes for the second-order completeness principle in analysis and the second-order replacement (or separation) principle in set theory.
The issue here relates to another author who says that I claim too much. Azzouni ([1994] , Chapter 1, Section 3) states that two theses of Shapiro [1985] are that by invoking second-order languages with standard semantics, the philosopher solves the age-old problem of reference to mathematical objects and that standard semantics somehow explains how mathematicians communicate with each other. My view is supposed to be that 'ascent be-yond first-order idioms ehminates the problem of referential access (modulo isomorphism)' (p. lln). Azzouni then argues, correctly, that second-order logic cannot play this explanatory role. Standard semantics rules out nonstandard, unintended interpretations just by fiat-non-standard models are not part of the semantics. Thus, the explanatory question is begged. To show that second-order logic, with standard semantics, explains reference and communication, we have to assume that reference to the standard models has been accomplished in the meta-theory and that mathematicians can somehow communicate this to each other.
12 Azzouni concludes that ... second-order logic with standard semantics is treacherous: Its sirenlike notation can lull philosophers into an inadequate appreciation of how it gains its expressive power, (p. 18) I do not think that I (or Boolos, Corcoran, Hellman, etc.) are lulled in this way. Shapiro [1985] , [1990] , and [1991] should not be read as providing a solution to the problem of reference. Azzouni agrees that I am 'not merely concerned with the problem of referential access' in [1985] and [1990] . I also want to 'show that mathematical practice is best understood in secondorder terms...' I do not see how I was concerned with the 'problem of referential access' at all. Second-order logic does have substantial presuppositions, but these are the presuppositions of mathematics. As Church ([1956] , p. 326n) put it, The [second-order] notion of consequence... presupposes a certain absolute notion of ALL prepositional functions... But this is presupposed also in classical mathematics, especially classical analysis. The thesis that we understand second-order languages with standard semantics is of-a-piece with the thesis that we understand ordinary mathematical discourse. Second-order consequence is no worse than standard mathematics (see also note 4 above). Azzouni himself agrees that the conclusion of Shapiro [1990] is that the debate between an advocate of secondorder logic and a skeptic ends in a standoff (see also Shapiro [1991] , Chapter 8). The substantial claim of Shapiro [1991 ] (and Church [1956 ) is that a logic with substantial presuppositions has an important role in foundational studies, but this role is not that of justifying mathematical practice or of explaining how successful reference and communication works.
This task of codifying mathematical practice relates to one final matter, the status of the items in the range of the second-order variables. For 12 Wagner [1987) and Weston |1976] made similar arguments against second-order logic. 13 The problem of reference is addressed in my forthcoming book on structuralism (Shapiro [1997] , Chapter 4). Second-order logic is involved, but not in the blatant question-begging way alleged by Azzouni. HeJIman [1989] is another author who takes second-order logic seriously, but does not fall for the sirenlike call. His book is also concerned with problems of reference, but clearly he does not regard such problems as resolved by a blind appeal to second-order consequence. simplicity, let us stick to monadic variables, although the issues are the same for all types. In standard semantics, monadic variables range over the powerset of the domain of discourse. Thus, second-order languages (with standard semantics) seem to traffic in sets, or set-like entities like concept extensions. As noted above, some authors, like Quine, argue that this alone disqualifies second-order logic from being logic. Logic should be topic-neutral, and not presuppose set-theoretic entities. Again, the main response in Shapiro [1991] is simply to deny that there is a sharp boundary between mathematics and logic.
Nevertheless, I did distinguish what I call the logical sense of 'set' from the iterative sense of 'set', or at least I tried to (p. 18). An iterative set is a member of the iterative hierarchy V, the very large mathematical structure studied in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. The logical sense of 'set' concerns the subsets of a fixed domain. In this sense, the locution 'set' is like an indexical expression, since its extension depends on the context of use.
14 Thus, in arithmetic logical sets are collections of natural numbers; in analysis logical sets are collections of real numbers; and in set theory logical sets are collections of iterative sets (which are sometimes called 'classes').
In every context, logical sets have a Boolean structure, in that every set S has a complement, the collection of objects that are not in S. There is also a universal set, which is the complement of the empty set. In contrast, iterative sets are not Boolean, since the complement of an iterative set is not an iterative set. There is no universal set-no iterative set of all iterative sets-but there is a universal class, V itself.
Both Jane" and Cocchiarella made strong cases against my use of the term 'logical' in this context. It is certainly true that in some guise or other, sets have been treated by various logicians, including Boole, Schroder, Peano, Dedekind, Frege, and Russell. The problem is with the guise. Traditionally, concepts fall within the purview of logic. Logic concerns predication and, as Cocchiarella noted, it 'is concepts, and not sets, that are predicable entities' ([1993] , p. 457). For some logicians-most notably Frege-sets are admitted into logic only as the extensions of concepts. According to Cocchiarella ([1993] , p. 456), in a Fregean system, ... it is concepts, and not 'sets' or 'subeets' of a domain, that are taken as the values of predicate variables, and classes (to the extent they are admitted at all) are assumed, as Frege put it, to have their being in the concepts whose extensions they are, and not (as on the Cantorian, iterative notion of set) in their members. I... maintain that the concept is logically prior to its extension; and I regard as futile to attempt to take the extension of a concept as a class, and make it rest, not on the concept but on single things... (FVege [1984] , pp. 226, 228) Cocchiarella's and Jane's point is that while iterative sets are respectable mathematical entities, they are not among the basic building blocks of logic. Logical sets-the extensions of concepts-are closer to the foundation because they are tied to properties or concepts. According to Cocchiarella, iterative set theory can be used to model the semantics of second-order languages 'externally', in which case some iterative sets serve as 'proxies' for logical sets.
Jane" holds that the logical notion of set is 'I fear, ill-determined' (p. 78). Accordingly, the only solid notion of 'set' available is the iterative one, and that is thoroughly mathematical. It follows that second-order logic is full of mathematical content, and so is not logic in the strict sense. Many sentences of 'pure' second-order logic depend on the fine structure of the set-theoretic hierarchy-on matters far up in the ordinal ranks. This much is correct (see note 11 above). However, Jane" draws a negative conclusion:
... given that all these problems whose solution requires such amount of set theory can be naturally formulated in the second-order language of familiar structures, can we reasonably maintain that the conception of set relevant to . second-order logic is a different conception from that of iterative set theory? I think not. (Jane [1993] , p. 76) The development and study of the semantics of second-order languages does employ the full powerset operation of set theory. Officially, the semantics is conducted in the set-theoretic hierarchy. 15 In other words, the theory of iterative sets is used to shed light on the items in the range of second-order variables. Thus, one should not make too much of my distinction between logical and iterative sets, and I admit that it is misleading to put the distinction in such traditional terms. Perhaps 'Boolean set' might 15 The same goes for first-order logic and the non-standard Henkin semantics for secondorder languages. In all cases, the range of interpretations is taken from the iterative hierarchy. For the first-order and Henkin treatments, however, the powerset operation plays no significant role. We do not rely on the 'fine-structure' of the iterative hierarchy. Resnik suggests that one of Quine's arguments is that 'we have no means of fixing secondorder consequence in advance' (Resnik [1993] why the double correlation thesis is consistent. At one point, Cocchiarella suggests that 'there are no concepts simpliciter, other than the concepts that can be realized within the context of a theory' ([1993] , p. 465). The notion of a 'context of use' is crucial here.
I do not wish to deny the fruitfulness and extensive applicability of Cocchiarella's work, and he does not dispute my theses concerning the expressive power of second-order languages with standard semantics. Let both flowers try to bloom. The double correlation thesis, and the concomitant rejection of the full powerset operation (leading to Cantor's theorem) may not preclude the aforementioned technique of embedding X-structures into richer ones, but Cocchiarella's systems do not seem to sanction this technique either. Which concepts are in the range of the bound higherorder variable in, say, the induction principle of arithmetic? Does Cocchiarella's perspective allow the existence of concepts that do not correspond to (second-order) arithmetic formulas? This, I believe, is the crux of the matter, since the definable concepts are not enough for mathematical practice (see Maddy [1993] ). To continue an example from above, suppose that a mathematician defines a set of natural numbers by referring to items beyond arithmetic. For example, she may embed the natural numbers in set theory and give a set-theoretic definition of a set of numbers. Since we are no longer in the context of the given theory of arithmetic, the mathematician may not have characterized an arithmetic concept and so she may not have characterized a logical set of natural numbers. Cocchiarella's systems are silent on whether there is such an arithmetic concept, and thus whether the induction principle applies to the defined set. Our mathematician may have proved a theorem about iterative sets, but has she proved a theorem about the natural numbers? Similar considerations apply to the completeness principle of analysis and to Frege's definition of the ancestral. Can we instantiate the bound higher-order variable with any concept, no matter what resources are needed to define it? If not, the restriction severely hampers the mathematician's use of the principle. From my perspective, the power of Frege's construction is that it allows us to instantiate the variable with sets no matter how they are defined. We have a single induction principle, a single ancestral, etc. Standard semantics captures this insight, or this presupposition.
In Chapter 8, I take the use of second-order languages, with standard semantics, to reflect the mathematician's rejection of Skolemite relativity, a relativity that extends to virtually all mathematical objects. Cocchiarella replies that 'it is hard to see how mathematical practice can really settle this ' (p. 466) . He insists that 'it is an enormous jump from [the] notion of class as the extension of a concept to the notion of a set as determined by Cantor's powerset theorem ' (pp. 463-4) . This may be so, but it is hard to envision an intermediate framework that preserves some of the expressive resources of second-order languages and yet satisfies the double correlation thesis. Cocchiarella seems to agree. He takes the framework of his systems to provide 'a conceptual or philosophical rationale for Skolemite relativism, rather than a reason for rejecting it' (p. 464).
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